



2014 SOG Conference What Makes Administrative Agencies Tick?

Call for Papers

at

The Federman School of Public Policy The Department of Political Science

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Mount Scopus, 91905
Jerusalem
Israel

5-7 January, 2014

This SOG Conference intends to shed light on several themes of considerable importance to the understanding of public agencies as both governmental institutions and administrative organizations. It intends to do so by placing government agencies' decision making and behavior at the center of attention in order to facilitate a systematic thinking on how government agencies operate and how the administrative state functions. In particular, this conference encourages the development of theories and methods that shed light on the internal shaping of administrative organizations' uneven responsiveness to – and their management of – their multiple external overseers, competitors, collaborators, clients, regulated entities and the public at large.

Our aim is to bring together papers that transcend the dichotomous view of administrative agencies as either shirking external control, or as fully responsive to external signals from their political environment. Theoretical developments in this direction are rapidly accumulating within our discipline. Recent research over the past decade revolves around the endogenous shaping and consequences of bureaucratic autonomy (Carpenter, 2001; Meier and Krause 2003a, b; Christensen and Laegreid, 2006; Yesilkagit, 2004; Yesilkagit and Christensen, 2010; Carpenter and Krause 2010; Krause 2010) and reputation (e.g., Carpenter 2002; 2004; 2010; Maor 2007, 2010, 2011; Maor and Sulitzeanu-Kenan forthcoming; Maor, Gilad and Ben-Nun Bloom 2012; Gilad, Maor and Ben-Nun Bloom 2012); the shaping and patterns of individual officials' blame avoidance strategies (e.g., Hood 2011; Hood et al. 2009; Hood and Lodge, 2006; Moynihan, 2012); officials' partial circumvention of external transparency measures (Hood, 2007; Hood and Rothstein, 2001; Roberts, 2005); the

internal mediation of bureaucratic attention (e.g., Jennings, 2009; May, Workman and Jones 2008); and the consequences of bureaucratic capacity (Ting 2011) and of bureaucratic identity (Gilad, 2008). Taking the national - as opposed to organizational - level as the unit of analysis, Lodge and Wegrich have explored the consequences of cultural biases for regulatory action, and for media discourse, in response to public calls for enhanced regulation in the aftermath of crisis (Lodge, 2011; Lodge and Wegrich, 2011).

The above relatively new theoretical streams that have evolved alongside more traditional schools of thought — principal-agency theory and transaction-costs economics — have generated several significant insights on the fundamental powers of bureaucratic agencies and on central issues of modern democracy. Still, the systematic body of knowledge that places intra-organizational structures, processes and strategies, at the centre of analysis concerning what makes governmental agencies tick is largely unexplored.

Hence, our interest is in the intra-organizational factors and strategies that mediate agencies' responsiveness to external signals and demands, and in the endogenous formation, evolution and change of these internal factors. Some relevant questions may involve the following:

How do agencies confront the challenge of operating in an environment composed of diverse audiences including legislators, clientele groups, policy experts, rival agencies, ordinary citizens and the media?

What are the foundations of agencies' motivations, capacity, reputation, attention and identity, and to what extent do these internal factors impact upon their strategic decision in a context of a richly textured political environment?

How fundamental are the formation and cultivation of the aforementioned intra-organizational factors to our understanding of public administration in a democracy? To what extent have the basic assumptions and empirical work addressing the aforementioned factors extend our understanding of the functioning of government agencies?

How do conflicting policy preferences within administrative agencies come about, and how does this affect their ability to execute their policy mission?

How do agency heads' individual career concerns impact upon agency behavior?

How do reputational considerations shape interagency interactions in exclusive or shared regulatory contexts?

What explains inter-agency and over-time variance in administrative agencies' intangible cultures, identities and reputations?

How do formal structures (e.g. legal mandates, terms of nomination) interact with intangibles institutions — such as organizational culture, identity and reputation — to shape agency responsiveness to external pressures and demands?

To what extent have New Public Management reforms and networked-forms of governance reshaped agencies' capacities, identities and strategies for blame avoidance and reputation management? What impact have these changes had on agencies' attentiveness and responsiveness to external pressures and demands?

We invite conceptual and empirical papers which focus on decision-making and behavior of governmental agencies and are informed by the aforementioned agent-based approaches.

Keynote Speakers

Opening Keynote - Prof. Dan Carpenter, Department of Government, Harvard University

Closing Keynote - Prof. Donald Moynihan, La Follette School of Public Affairs, University of Wisconsin-Madison

Application Deadline/Arrangements

Paper proposals (500 words) addressing the conference theme should be sent electronically to gilads@mssc.huji.ac.il and to msmaor@mssc.huji.ac.il by **August 31st 2013** with 'SOG paper' as subject. Acceptance of papers will be notified by email by **September 30th 2013**. Please be advised that panel places are limited and that participants are [required to become SOG members](#). There is no separate conference fee aside from the SOG membership fees.

Due to budget constraints, participation in this conference is restricted to 35 paper presenters, and to only one presenter per paper. If we end up receiving more than 35 paper proposals, the conference committee will select those 35 presenters whose papers best fit the conference theme. Unfortunately, we are unable to host attendees who are not paper presenters.

ADMINISTRATION

Venue

The venue of the conference is the Mount Zion Hotel, Jerusalem.

Financial Support

In line with the SOG guideline, we assume responsibility for most on-site costs for selected overseas participants. The conference organizers will cover the

accommodation costs (2 nights) of the first-named author as well as those attending by special invitation. Breakfasts, lunches & dinners will be provided.

Organizing Committee

Prof. Moshe Maor, Department of Political Science.

Dr. Sharon Gilad, Dep. of Political Science & The Federman School of Public Policy.

Dr. Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan, Dep. of Political Science & The Federman School of Public Policy.

Dr. Anat Gofen-Sarig, The Federman School of Public Policy.

Further Information

Should you require any further information regarding conference arrangements, please contact Dr. Sharon Gilad at gilads@mscc.huji.ac.il or Prof. Moshe Maor at mamaor@mscc.huji.ac.il

Useful Websites

Israel
City of Jerusalem

<http://www.goisrael.com/Tourism>
<http://tour.jerusalem.muni.il/eng/>

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